在當代知識論的討論中,可靠論是非證據主義中一個重要的立場。可靠論者主張,一個信念是被證成的,僅當這個信念來自於一個可靠的信念產生程序。然而,由於無法明確地指出到底哪一個信念產生程序是可靠的,可靠論的立論基礎受到了嚴重的挑戰,哲學家們稱此為「普遍性問題」。康尼與費德蒙指出,目前的可靠論版本都無法處理普遍性問題,而且他們進一步論證,可靠論從原則上就無法避免普遍性問題,因此是一個沒有成功希望的證成理論。在這篇文章中,筆者將檢討康尼與費德蒙對可靠論的批評,並試著從人類的認知表現來解消普遍性問題。
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